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Bergson before Bergsonism 
Traversing “Bergson’s Failing” in Susanne K. Langer’s 
Philosophy of Art 
Iris van der Tuin 
Utrecht University 
In spite of the critical and creative importance of Gilles Deleuze’s 
Bergsonism1 for the reception of the philosophy of Henri Bergson from the 
second half of the 1960s up until today, this essay is positioned before 1966 
and in a zone spatially and disciplinarily separated both from France and 
from continental philosophy. (Of course, following the physics of waves, 
such separations will soon prove to be exaggerations.) In this essay, I discuss 
the work of North-American philosopher Susanne K. Langer (1895-1985) 
and I provide a close reading of her 1953 argument about Bergson’s failing, 
the positing which will also prove to be exaggerated. Langer argues that 
Bergson was most artists’ favorite philosopher in the 1950s.2 In want of a 
true philosophy of art, Langer was not keen on following what artists said 
about philosophy. Nor did she follow the philosophical discipline of 
aesthetics. In this essay, I am not interested in Langer’s seeming gendered 
eccentricity or in proving these negations right or wrong. I am interested in 
Langer’s unique relating to Bergson, because, in spite of the strong 
affirmation of Bergson’s failing, she exemplifies a sense of non-linear and 
non-oppositional relating of theoretical texts and traditions. These texts 
include the work of Bergson and the philosophical traditions with which he 
grappled. How does the philosophy of Bergson emerge from such a relating, 
that is, how did Bergson look before Bergsonism? How does a Bergsonian 
philosophy look and how can such a theory be reached by a scholar and in a 
scholarly context heavily influenced by Deleuze’s Bergsonism? 
 
Toward Reading Langer Diffractively 
The scholars to whom Susanne K. Langer dedicates two of her books 
provide a first indication of the nature of Langer’s life and work. Philosophy 
in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art is dedicated to 
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Alfred North Whitehead.3 Between 1924 and 1926 Langer wrote her Ph.D. 
dissertation with Whitehead (1861-1947) as her advisor at Radcliffe College 
in Cambridge, MA, then the women’s college running parallel to Harvard 
University. Langer calls Whitehead “my great Teacher and Friend” on the 
opening page of her stellar bestseller. The book’s sequel, Feeling and Form: A 
Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key, was published in 1953 
with the dedication: “To the happy memory of ERNST CASSIRER.”4 Langer, 
born in New York City to German immigrants, had started reading Cassirer 
(1874-1945) in the 1920s, but only met him in 1941 after the latter had also 
migrated to the United States. They stayed closely in touch until Cassirer’s 
death in 1945, a year before Langer’s translation of his Sprache und Mythos 
from 1925 was released.5  
A first way in which the dedications are made complex in the books 
themselves can be found on what I would call the “cartographies” of 
scholars influential to Langer’s work that appear in the mentioned books as 
well. In the preface to the third edition of Philosophy in a New Key Langer 
argues that her book, although imperfect and representing the embryonic 
stages of her thought, “still proclaims the work of a brilliant, though 
strangely assorted, intellectual generation—Whitehead, Russell, 
Wittgenstein, Freud, Cassirer, to name but a few—who launched the attack 
on the formidable problem of symbol and meaning, and established the 
keynote of philosophical thought in our day.”6 Feeling and Form, in turn, 
closes cartographically: 
Despite all shortcomings, blind leads, or mistakes that they may see 
in each other’s doctrines, I believe that Bell, Fry, Bergson, Croce, 
Baensch, Collingwood, Cassirer, and I (not to forget such literary 
critics as Barfield and Day Lewis and others too, whom I have not 
named and perhaps not even read) have been and are, really, 
engaged on one philosophical project. It was Cassirer—though he 
never regarded himself as an aesthetician—who hewed the 
keystone of the structure, in his broad and disinterested study of 
symbolic forms; and I, for my part, would put that stone in place, to 
join and sustain what so far we have built.7  
What is remarkable is that Langer finds herself in the sole company of men. 
Donald Dryden opens his literary biography of Langer with the words that 
she “was one of the first women to pursue an academic career in philosophy 
in the United States and the first to receive both professional and popular 
recognition as an American philosopher.”8 However, as the research of 
Arabella Lyon shows, scholarship often subsumes Langer under the heading 
of the male scholars she lists.9 Lyon also mentions Langer’s own denial of 
any impact of the fact that she was a woman, contrary to proof such as 
Langer’s lowly ranked post-Ph.D. position at Harvard, the fact that tenure 
came only at the very end of her career,10 and the necessity of Whitehead 
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putting in a good word for Langer so that she could get her early work 
published in the journal Mind.11 
Apart from gender, also remarkable is Langer’s phrasing: the “brilliant, 
though strangely assorted, intellectual generation” of the first cartography is 
“really, engaged on one philosophical project” according to the second. The 
appearance of Bergson at the heart of an affirmation of a philosophical 
project which is really one comes as a surprise by the time the reader of 
Feeling and Form has reached the monograph’s conclusion (although the 
appendix immediately following the concluding statement discusses the 
filmic mode of expression, a new art form that had highly fascinated 
Bergson, too). The table of contents even announces a lengthy discussion of 
Bergson’s work as “Bergson’s failing”! Whereas Langer says Bergson’s 
“dream (one dares not say ‘concept’ in connection with his thought) of la 
durée réelle brings his metaphysics […] to the very brink of a philosophy of 
art,”12 he is also said to suffer from “a lack of logical daring; in his horror of 
a pernicious abstraction, he fled to a realm of no abstraction at all, and 
having wounded his spirit on the tools of physical science he threw away 
tools altogether.”13 For Langer, Bergson does not carefully, that is, logically 
conceptualize his abstract philosophical thoughts as a result of his 
engagement with, and evaluation of the scientific toolbox (science’s 
abstractions are illogical). 
Langer seems to have one clear (negative) opinion about the Bergson’s 
work, although she opens Feeling and Form with a statement about polemics 
and their distortive role in philosophizing that I deem Bergsonian. Langer 
writes: “Were I to follow out every refutation of other doctrines which my 
line of argument implies, that line would be lost in a tangle of controversy. 
Consequently, I have avoided polemics as much as possible (though, of 
course, not altogether).”14 This affirmative stance goes against the grain of 
scholarly habit, a habit owing to which a scholar is generally in “danger of 
losing one’s way in the pigeon-holes of purely academic description.”15 This 
is Bergson’s take on polemics as expressed in the essay “Introduction to 
Metaphysics”: 
Divergences are striking between the schools, that is to say, in 
short, between the groups of disciples formed around certain of the 
great masters. But would one find them as clear-cut between the 
masters themselves? Something here dominates the diversity of 
systems, something, I repeat, simple and definite like a sounding of 
which one feels that it has more or less reached the bottom of a 
same ocean, even though it brings each time to the surface very 
different materials. It is on these materials that disciples normally 
work: in that is the role of analysis. And the master, in so far as he 
formulates, develops, translates into abstract ideas what he brings, 
is already, as it were, his own disciple. But the simple act which has 
set analysis in motion and which hides behind analysis, emanates 
I r i s  v a n  d e r  T u i n  |  1 7 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.776 
from a faculty quite different from that of analysing. This is by very 
definition intuition.16 
Apart from the fact that this quote is also analogous to Langer’s take on 
scholars’ obsession with classifying artistic styles or traditions and on their 
consequential failure to notice (the problem of) artistic creation per se,17 the 
task that I have set myself for this essay is to make clear how Bergson’s take 
on polemics, or, let’s say, on the entanglement of epistemology and ontology 
forms the core of my interpretation of and approach to Langer’s philosophy 
of art. Thus, Bergson’s failing will soon dissolve.  
The fact that this is contrary to Langer’s own words will be 
circumvented in a threefold manner. First, on a descriptive register, I will 
verify that even Langer herself ultimately reworks the assertion of “Bergson’s 
failing.” Second, it is sound to draw Bergson back in, in spite of claims to the 
contrary, because it is in the nature of the cartographical method to affirm 
that one’s own historical relations to and the systematic relations between 
philosophers are fundamentally open.18 Langer endorses this openness by 
including the work of those ‘whom I have not named and perhaps not even read’ 
to her bibliography. In Philosophy in a New Key Langer says “[q]uotations 
could be multiplied almost indefinitely.”19 The question I must address in 
this essay, then, is how Langer’s ‘strangely assorted, intellectual generation’ 
is best viewed if it should not be treated historically or systematically. I will 
demonstrate that the two aforementioned arguments ultimately rest on 
“diffraction” as a methodology for establishing a philosophy of the 
humanities that is not based on polemics, especially because polemics distort 
insight into the nature of art. The diffractive reading methodology was 
brought to the fore by Donna Haraway in the 1990s and the methodology 
got picked up by her colleague Karen Barad in the 2000s.20 The current 
Haraway-Baradian wave in women’s, gender, and sexuality studies, or 
feminist, queer, and trans theory, comes long after Langer’s career has come 
to an end. But the notion of the wave, again, disqualifies such linear 
notations. How does Langer exemplify a sense of non-linear relating of 
theoretical texts? And how does such a relating uncover how Bergsonian 
philosophy looked, or was received prior to 1966? In what ways do 
diffraction patterns materialize in the oeuvre of Susanne K. Langer, the 
scholar who “cannot be catalogued”?21 
I zoom in on Feeling and Form and I focus on the ways in which 
Whitehead, Cassirer, and Bergson feature in the development of Langer’s 
philosophy of art, as well as in the resulting philosophy itself. This dual 
perspective on what went into the philosophy and on the final philosophical 
outcome typifies what a diffractive reading enables the epistemologist to do: 
she is—in Baradian terms—an onto-epistemologist generating insight in the 
nature of knowledge and knowledge production, but also in how 
knowledges and knowledge theories come about and remain in motion. 
Onto-epistemology signifies “the study of practices of knowing in being,”22 
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which implies, for starters, that any inclination toward assumed 
“thingification”23 must be left behind, because the assumption of the 
independent existence of a “thing”—whether a fact or an artifact about 
which facts can be produced—may be altogether unfounded. The way in 
which Langer works with Whitehead, Cassirer, and Bergson is equally onto-
epistemological as it signals an intricate take on the production of 
philosophical knowledge about art. This knowledge unfolds along the 
dynamic lines of a diffraction patterning as I will soon demonstrate. This 
patterning is the first step toward qualifying Langer’s assertion about 
Bergson’s failure. After all, such a strong statement thingifies Bergson’s 
philosophical oeuvre, whereas it is in the nature of a philosophical oeuvre to 
remain in motion. This implies that my essay does not provide the last word 
about Langer’s philosophy, its relation with Bergsonian philosophy, or the 
ways in which Bergson features in past, present, and future philosophizing. 
 
Diffraction Patterns in Feeling and Form 
Let me start with Whitehead. Importantly, Whitehead features in the 
opening sequence of Feeling and Form as the quintessential philosopher for 
whom philosophy is “a living venture.”24 Langer explains that whereas 
philosophy is not (a) science owing to the fact that it does not start from a 
concrete problem for which the best approach is selected in order to produce 
a solution or come to a final conclusion, philosophers do often get seduced 
by one particular approach which is then applied to an age-old 
philosophical Problem. This seduction goes against the grain of the nature of 
philosophy, which, when respected, differs from science in that scientific 
questions ask after order in the physical realm whilst philosophical 
questions deal with “the implications and other interrelations of ideas.”25 
About the philosophical method of those thinkers who are not approach-
driven Langer says: “Such philosophy is built up by the principle of 
generalization. It is all of a piece, yet it cannot be summarized in the 
statement of one belief, and elected or spurned as ‘such-and-such-ism;’ 
neither can it be simply ‘applied’ to interpret experience as a whole.”26 
Langer calls the mode of expansion generated by this particular 
generalizability “fecundity.”27 Neither scientists nor art critics nor 
aestheticians have so far approached the problem of art in a way that 
respects the philosophical principles of generalizability and fecundity, says 
Langer.28 Once these principles are respected, the problem of artistic creation 
and the question “what does art create?” will present themselves as central 
to the philosophy of art, with the following extraordinary effect: 
As the subject becomes organized, the ideas that have been 
advanced in the past take on a new significance; and one finds that 
an amazing amount of good work in this field has already been 
done. The literature of art theory, which looks so incoherent and so 
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cluttered with hapless “approaches,” is really rich in vital thoughts 
and valuable, scholarly findings. […] The literature behind us 
(known or unknown to any particular thinker) and the issues still 
before us should take their proper forms and places in that 
perspective, wherever we encounter them in the progress of 
philosophical thought.29  
In other words, what philosophy as a “living venture” does is create its own 
past in one stroke with its future. The minute we leave behind the habit to 
apply concepts or to follow an -ism, and engage philosophically with works 
of art (or, principally, anything whatsoever), a rich philosophy of art 
emerges. This philosophy-in-movement cuts through thingified thoughts 
about how concepts and -isms relate, and linear mapping of philosophizing 
is dissolved. 
With Langer’s affirmation of a vital thought or a living philosophy 
comes a remark about the past, and this past is seen as virtual (it is “known 
or unknown to any particular thinker” so it is impersonal but generative). Later 
in Feeling and Form, that is, at the point when Langer discusses narrative 
poetry or prose as being characterized by the semblance of memory, 
Whitehead and the impersonal interlocking of past-present-future make 
their comeback. Langer discusses this theme (memory, in short) through the 
work of Whitehead. But as the reader, I leap into Bergson’s work when 
Langer discusses fiction writers’ creations as virtual memories (part of the 
larger category of writing as such which expresses virtual life). I want to call 
this complication of the discussion held in Feeling and Form “diffractive.” 
When Whitehead is presented and I leap into Bergson, a pattern presents 
itself that does not respect disciplinary existencies (Whitehead and Bergson 
are not from the same philosophical tradition). Respecting the non-habitual 
pattern as it emerges allows the thinker to affirm and strengthen dynamic 
links between schools of thought or scholars that are usually treated in 
isolation or as separate. Such dynamism in the philosophical canon is what I 
call—with Haraway and Barad—diffraction. Isolating a philosopher implies 
his work30 is seen as either an endless source of inspiration or as passé. 
Treating a philosopher as an exponent of a philosophical tradition implies 
the tradition exhausts the thought. Reading philosophy diffractively has 
none of these three effects. 
Continuing Langer’s discussion of the semblance of memory, the open 
cartographical movement swells when Marcel Proust (1871-1922) is staged.31 
After all, the latter distinguished between “voluntary memory, the memory 
of the intellect” and the fact that “the pictures which that kind of memory 
shows us preserve nothing of the past itself,”32 on the one hand, and, on the 
other, involuntary memory introduced around the world-famous episode 
with the petites madeleines (French small shell-shaped cakes). Proust 
presented involuntary memory as a form of creation—“It is face to face with 
something which does not yet exist, which it [mind] alone can make actual, 
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which it alone can bring into the light of day”33—and this has been much 
commented on, especially by Deleuze in Bergsonism.34 It is well known that 
Whitehead in Process and Reality hints at Proust’s madeleine-fragment, albeit 
in order to discuss the future: “The future is merely real, without being 
actual; whereas the past is a nexus of actualities.”35 Reality, in Whitehead, is 
ontologically prior to actualities. Smelling a madeleine here becomes tied to 
reaching there merely real of the future. One gets catapulted into the real 
(ontology) where there is not yet an actual (epistemology). Deleuze, in 
Difference and Repetition,36 and in Bergsonism37 cites Proust directly and 
discusses the (virtual) past.38 Here, the “leap into ontology”39 involves the 
leap into a general past, which is not the past of an actualized instance or 
affair. This is the original fragment in which Proust treats overcoming 
voluntary memory: 
But let a noise or a scent, once heard or once smelt, be heard or 
smelt again in the present and at the same time in the past, real 
without being actual, ideal without being abstract, and immediately the 
permanent and habitually concealed essence of things is liberated 
and our true self, which seemed—had perhaps for long years 
seemed—to be dead but was not altogether dead, is awakened and 
reanimated as it receives the celestial nourishment that is brought 
to it. A minute freed from the order of time has re-created in us, to 
feel it, the man freed from the order of time. And one can 
understand that this man should have confidence in his joy, even if 
the simple taste of a madeleine does not seem logically to contain 
within it the reasons for this joy, one can understand that the word 
“death” should have no meaning for him; situated outside time, 
why should he fear the future?40 
Steven Shaviro explains that Deleuze’s and Whitehead’s uses of Proust can 
be brought together, since “[t]he process of actualization is the hinge, or the 
interstice, not only between past and future, but also between the two forms 
of causality” whereby “two forms of causality” refers to the interplay of 
determination and indetermination, or the fact that in the event of an 
actualization, a new past and future get created.41  
Drawing this technical discussion to a close in order to return to 
Langer’s philosophy of art, let me bring in Gregg Lambert who references 
Deleuze’s “involuntary machine of interpretation” as just another name for 
the literary machine:  
Involuntary because writers do not know beforehand what kinds of 
signs the machines they invent will produce, in fact, they don’t 
even know how the machine they have created will actually 
work—if it will work at all! The art of writing is also a process of 
interpreting the machine in determining the conditions of its 
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production, in addition to interpreting the signs and effects that 
these created machines produce.42  
Langer would have been in agreement with Lambert that the writer Proust 
in particular is worthy of the latter interpretative exercise: 
It was a peculiarity of Proust’s genius to work always with a poetic 
core that was a spontaneous and perfect formulation of something 
in actual memory. This intense, emotionally charged recollection, 
completely articulate in every detail, yet as sudden and immediate 
as a present experience, not only was the catalyst that activated his 
imagination, but also constituted his ideal of poetic illusion, to be 
achieved by the most conscious and subtle kind of story-telling.43 
Although Langer phrases the end result in terms of Plato’s “eternity” as 
“[i]deas are timeless; in a lyric they are not said to have occurred, but are 
virtually occurring; the relations that hold them together are timeless, too. 
The whole creation in a lyric is an awareness of a subjective experience, and 
the tense of subjectivity is the ‘timeless’ present,”44 Lambert argues in his 
characteristic vein that  
In Proust’s work of art, “philosophy vies with nonphilosophy” (i.e., 
the Proustian image of memory vies with the Platonic theory of 
ideas), because it is only through the writing machine invented by 
Proust that philosophy obtains a better understanding of the 
function of the idea in reminiscence, that is, a better concept of how 
past is produced in relation to the sensible present in a manner that 
is essentially productive or creative.45  
We saw this battling take place in Langer, who intellectually stuck to Plato 
but also created a tangle of contemporary thinkers in order to spell out 
Proust’s image philosophically. 
The second example of a diffractive pattern in Feeling and Form that I 
want to highlight in an attempt to build up to a re-evaluation of Bergson’s 
failing (as it is not in the nature of open cartographical philosophizing to 
argue that a certain thinker has forever failed) concerns Langer’s chapters 
about the art form of dance and the fact that she discusses the virtual-actual 
coupling by referring to the work of Cassirer, whereas this is a conceptual 
pair in the realm of philosophies of time and temporality that I deem deeply 
Bergsonian. Let me start here: Langer argues that “[t]he art of dancing is a 
wider category than any particular conception that may govern a tradition, a 
style, a sacred or secular use; wider than the cult dance, the folk dance, the 
ballroom dance, the ballet, the modern ‘expressive dance.’”46 She alludes to 
the fact that all these distinctions—and it is possible to extend the list with 
binary oppositions such as the contemporary examples of dramatic and 
postdramatic theatre47—are  
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Really much less useful than the consideration of what is created in 
the various kinds of dance, and what purposes, therefore, the 
various rhythmic, mimetic, musical, acrobatic, or other elements 
serve. What is created is the image of a world of vital forces, 
embodied or disembodied […] the several dance elements have 
essentially constructive functions. They have to establish, maintain, 
and articulate the play of “Powers.”48 
Here Langer makes an onto-epistemological claim because she secures a link 
between the classificatory approach which does not allow the scholar to 
reach a discussion about the ontology of art (here: dance; the rhythmic 
expression of impersonal agencies through gesture) and its alternative which 
does (Bergson calls this alternative “intuitive,” but we will shortly see that 
precisely intuition is not to Langer’s liking).49 Although certain time periods 
invite the blossoming of particular categories of dance owing to the powers 
that be (the status quo)50 and although dance might regress under the 
influence of secularization or degenerate as a result of gendered 
instrumentalization,51 Feeling and Form does not import what Hélène 
Metzger has so powerfully named “chronological empiricism” into the 
philosophy of art.52 Langer argues that dance(r)s express a “relation of 
forces”53 that is neither physical nor psychological but—to borrow from the 
Proustian discussion—“real without being actual”: “Dance gesture is not 
real gesture, but virtual. The bodily movement, of course, is real enough; but 
what makes it emotive gesture […] is illusory, so the movement is “gesture” 
only within the dance. It is actual movement, but virtual self-expression.”54 The 
question is: for what does she need Cassirer? 
Cassirer appears in Feeling and Form in an attempt to explain how 
dancers (artists) talk about dance (art). In contradistinction to Langer’s 
contention that “[j]ust as the most interesting philosophy of science has been 
developed to meet the logical problems of the laboratory, so the most vital 
issues in philosophy of art stem from the studio,”55 artists themselves make 
confusing statements about their practice (conflations) that make Langer, in 
turn, argue that artistic consciousness is one with Cassirer’s “mythical 
consciousness.”56 The core conflation artists are susceptible to making 
pertains to the virtual-actual coupling. What do (contemporary) artists do 
wrong? Well, their mistake must be sought in “the failure to distinguish 
between what is actual and what is virtual in the making of the symbol, and 
furthermore, between the ‘virtual’ symbol itself and its import, which refers 
us back to actuality.”57 For example, it has proven impossible for most 
dancers to leap out of the opposition between thinking in terms of either a 
whole (a chorus) built up out of individual performers or a chorus as wholly 
undividable, whereas “[a]ll these entities are dance elements that emerge from 
the interplay of virtual forces of ‘space tensions’ and ‘body tensions’ and 
even less specific ‘dance tensions’ created by music, lights, décor, poetic 
suggestion, and what not.”58 Owing to the fact that art fundamentally 
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involves a leap out of actuality, a conflation of the virtual and the actual is a 
real problem for Langer. Cassirer helps her typify the way artists talk about 
their art, and characterize the symbol. 
In The Logic of the Cultural Sciences Cassirer argues explicitly against 
linear historicizing, and therefore we must not think of mythical 
consciousness as a pre-scientific consciousness but rather as a specific one 
that that is indeed not scientific. (The above-mentioned fact that Langer lists 
both ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ uses of dance as “particular conceptions” 
indicates this, too.) Cassirer argues that “[h]istory is not simply chronology, 
and historical time is not objective physical time. The past is not gone for the 
historian in the same sense as for the natural scientist; it possesses and 
retains a peculiar presence.”59 For him, history is an “eternal present” in a 
flow of constant unfolding and transformation that makes signifiers such as 
earlier/later or first/second/third nonsensical. He argues that the 
“meaning” of this eternal present “is in none of the individual moments 
alone—and yet, on the other hand, it is complete and unbroken in each of 
them.”60 It is precisely a logic of separate things (entities) that Langer wants 
to shift by referencing Cassirer in the light of artists’ talk. Cassirer’s 
philosophy of art (or, as he himself says, of culture) affirms that a work of art 
belongs to the realms of nature and culture61 and must be approached in a 
manner that traverses matter and spirit: 
If we proceed from particular works and particular individuals to 
the forms of culture and immerse ourselves in their contemplation, 
then we stand on the threshold of a new problem. […] It is in these 
forms, and by virtue of them that the two spheres, the world of the 
‘I’ and that of the “you” first constitute [konstituieren] themselves. 
[…] As soon as we no longer begin with the I and the you as two 
substantially separate entities but instead place ourselves in the 
center of that mutual communication that realizes itself in language 
or in any other cultural form, this doubt disappears. In the 
beginning is the act: always, in the use of language, in artistic 
formation, in the process of thinking and research a specific activity 
expresses itself, and it is only in this activity that the I and the you 
at once find each other, and separate themselves from each other. 
They are in and with each other, as they preserve in this way their 
unity through speaking, thinking, and all kinds of artistic 
expression.62  
Importantly, as formulated in his essay “Form and Technology” (1930), this 
performative process of konstituieren goes as well for the relation between a 
non-human “I” and “you”: 
Notwithstanding this obedience towards the laws of nature, nature 
is never for technology something finished, wherein laws are 
merely posited. Nature is something that is perpetually posited 
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anew, something that is to be formed repeatedly. Mind always 
measures anew objects in relation to itself, and itself in relation to 
objects, in order to find and guarantee in this twofold act the 
genuine adaequatio, the actual “appropriateness,” of both. The more 
this movement takes hold, the more its force grows, the more the 
mind feels and knows its reality to have “grown.” This inner 
growth does not simply take place under a continuous leadership, 
under the rule and guardianship of the actual; rather, it demands 
that we constantly return from the “actual” to a realm of the 
“possible,” and see the actual itself according to this image of the 
possible.63 
Whereas this quotation further unpacks konstituieren by adding the process 
of adaequatio, it helps me to understand Cassirer’s use of “possible” when 
reading it through Bergson’s “virtual.” After all, the Bergsonian possible is 
“a reverse projection of the real,”64 which is not what Cassirer stands for as 
he precisely, yet in spite of his word choice does not posit fixed parameters! 
I guess that this is what the artist does, too, when he picks up the chisel 
approaching the stone, or the brush and the paint facing the canvas, et 
cetera. 
 
Historical, Systematic, and Diffractive Philosophy 
Now that I have demonstrated how diffractive patterns manifest themselves 
in Feeling and Form, I ask, moving ahead with the unfolding of the 
methodology of diffractive reading, to what extend we can speak of a failing 
of Bergson? After all, first, the way in which Feeling and Form theorizes 
memory with Whitehead is compatible with Bergson, and gains from a 
precise discussion of this compatibility that I have, in the previous section, 
described in terms of a reading experience of leaping in and out of oeuvres. 
Customizing the words of Shaviro, one could say that a theorizing that acts 
in compliance with this reading experience is “less concerned with 
reconstructing thought precisely than in delineating the outlines of the 
philosophical encounter, an encounter that changes our apprehension of the 
thinkers involved.”65 With Pierre Macherey, whose Hegel or Spinoza is 
another brilliant exemplification of reading diffractively, we may affirm that 
the question is “at what point this encounter occurs.”66 Second, Cassirer’s 
dynamic ontology unfolds in an argument against thingification that I deem 
Bergsonian,67 because treating theorists in isolation is irreconcilable with the 
open and dynamic parameters of cartography. What I hope to have shown 
as well is how Cassirer’s work gains from an encounter with Bergson’s 
differentiation between the possible and the real, and the virtual and the 
actual, simply because the encounter makes Cassirer’s konstituieren and 
adaequatio precise. 
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Before I proceed to a close reading of Langer’s treatment of Bergson 
(labeled a demonstration of “Bergson’s failing” by the former) I want to ask 
to what extent it matters that the name and the work of Bergson appear 
more often scribbled in the margins of my copy of Feeling and Form than in 
the neatly typeset sentences of the book itself? In fact, what is the difference 
between “the book itself” and “scribbles in the margins”? Does not this 
distinction mimic the realist logic of a world of sentences between the two 
covers of a book and a world “out there” that the book re-presents, a logic 
that my plea for diffractive reading tries to do away with by demonstrating 
how a relativist disconnection between word and world is not changing the 
realist logic of one-on-one resemblance but is in fact nothing but a 
humanities artifact given that the disconnection has never been tenable? 
Barad has argued that a diffractive reading methodology is performative in 
that it “mov[es] away from the familiar habits and seductions of 
representationalism (reflecting on the world from outside) to a way of 
understanding the world from within and as part of it.”68 The way in which 
I annotate my books, that is, the way in which I perform my reading of those 
books can be said to follow the logic of the hypertext, allowing me to go 
back and forth upon a second, third, or fourth reading and add more and 
more linkages. More precisely formulated, the tentacles that animate the 
typescript are “rhizomes,” to speak with Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus.69 Rhizomes rush beneath and through, and 
sprouting up from, the text.  
So, of course, Langer has studied with Whitehead and had a short but 
productive working relation with Cassirer. But does this fact imply that 
observations about those two thinkers—whether in the margins or typeset—
are more worthy for historical or systematic philosophy? Or are they more 
true, deserving importation to contemporary humanities debates and 
classrooms? If these questions are answered in the affirmative, 
“truthfulness” is, albeit oxymoronically quantified in the latter question, 
synonymous with correspondence: a true statement corresponds with a 
reality “out there.” This realism stands in unreal opposition to relativism, as 
argued above, whereas diffractive reading requires a move to “accounting 
for how practices matter.”70 And one of these practices is classification, the 
naturalistic tendency to classify what is to be found “out there” (including 
languages and schools of thought). What happens to Feeling and Form when 
the known, static yardsticks for truth and for methodological value are left 
behind, and when reading philosophical texts unfolds along the open and 
dynamic lines of cartographizing? What is a diffractive philosophy as 
demarcated from historical and systematic philosophical methodologies? 
Let me first perform a response to these questions by referring to The 
Logic of the Cultural Sciences once more. Given that—as we will see—Langer’s 
supposedly negative evaluation of Bergson hinges on intuition, it is 
interesting to look at the way in which Cassirer—to whom Langer dedicated 
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Feeling and Form—has reworked this concept. S.G. Lofts’ introduction to The 
Logic of the Cultural Sciences situates the work both historically and 
systematically, and points to Cassirer classifying Bergson as a dedicated 
adherent to turn-of-the-century “Lebensphilosophie” whose work on intuition 
stands for a negation of symbolic mediation.71 This hermeneutic reading (a 
well-known humanities methodology that serves both historical and 
systematic philosophy) does indeed appear to be the unreal opposite of 
natural-science realism, because Lofts’ footnotes, typically, provide the data 
that must make sure readers deem his interpretation correct (the 
interpretation as a fact). The argument is that the closing remarks of the 
third volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms72 structurally resemble The 
Logic of the Cultural Sciences, which leads to Lofts concluding that The Logic of 
the Cultural Sciences is (also) critical of Bergson.73 What happens when a 
productive encounter is created between Cassirer and Bergson?  
When discussing the nature of the concepts of the cultural sciences, 
Cassirer’s starting point is that the object of humanities study is such that 
nothing but a reductive analysis is made when elements are taken in 
isolation:  
For with the progress to a certain conceptual stage, everything 
depends not on the components that it contains but on the 
characteristic manner in which they are unified and joined together. 
Thus although it is indisputable that every cultural object manifests 
a physical, a psychological, and a historical side, the specific 
signification of this object remains, nevertheless, obscure as long as 
we isolate these elements from each other, instead of grasping them 
in their correlation, their mutual “penetration.”74 
The “mutual ‘penetration’” is the first indication of a subterranean link with 
Bergson: his famous concept of duration (la durée) is formulated precisely as 
“succession without distinction, […] a mutual penetration, an 
interconnexion [sic] and organization of elements, each one of which 
represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except 
by abstract thought.”75 The common measurement of time—seconds, 
minutes, hours, days, etc.—is nothing but a reduction for Bergson. Time, in 
his philosophy, is internal to any-body and their relatings. Cassirer is not 
looking for the abstract thought of measurement either, but he wishes to cut 
across both a natural-science take on culture (a take which withdraws from 
the mutual penetration and seeks refuge in universal laws) and a take which 
he calls, trickily, “natural”: 
We live in the words of language, the figurations of poetry and the 
plastic arts, the forms of music, the formations of religious ideas 
and beliefs. And it is only in them that we “know” each other. This 
intuitive knowledge does not yet have the character of “science.” 
[…] But this ‘natural’ understanding soon reaches its limits. We can 
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no more reach the depths of culture with the elements of intuition 
than simple sense perception can penetrate the depths of space.76 
Arguing against this natural (read: intuitive) take, his “logic of the cultural 
sciences” does (or advises [us] to do) precisely what I think is intuitive, 
owing to the fact that Bergsonian intuition does not come naturally 
(following common sense, of which intellectualism is the unreal opposite).77 
Also, intuition does not work with elements; intuition happens at once, like 
Proust’s Marcel being suddenly catapulted into aunt Léonie’s bedroom. 
Cassirer’s cultural sciences ultimately boil down to the following intricate 
movement (at one stroke traversing natural science and psychology and 
history as classes of scholarship): 
Its goal is not the universality of laws; but neither is it the 
individuality of facts and phenomena. In contrast to both it sets up 
an ideal of knowledge of its own. What it wants to know is the 
totality of the forms in which human life takes place. These forms are 
infinitely differentiated and yet they are not deprived of a unified 
structure. […] We do not become aware of this identity through 
watching, weighing, and measuring; nor do we come upon it 
through psychological inductions. It can manifest itself only 
through the act. A culture becomes accessible to us only if we 
actively enter into it; and this entering is not bound to the 
immediate present. Here the distinctions of time, the distinction of 
earlier and later, are relativized in the same way as spatial 
distinctions, the distinction of here and there, are relativized in 
physics and astronomy.78 
Of course, Bergson has argued in his famous 1903 “Introduction to 
Metaphysics” that “[m]etaphysics is […] the science which claims to dispense with 
symbols.”79 He has said that scientific analysis works with symbols and 
reductively cuts up what it observes for comparative purposes and in order 
to measure along temporality as a spatial parameter of successive moments. 
However, intuition, for Bergson, is “the sympathy by which one is 
transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there 
is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. […] Intuition, if it is possible, 
is a simple act.”80 Actively entering an object through a simple act in a 
manner that transports us out of the immediate present. This is the 
steppingstone to Cassirer’s cultural science as much as to Bergson’s intuitive 
metaphysics and it neatly sums up the event of encountering an art work on 
the basis of which Whitehead’s and Langer’s respective philosophies of art 
are constructed. 
Eugene T. Gadol, Langer’s research assistant for Feeling and Form, has 
beautifully formulated the aforementioned sensitivity as the ultimate quality 
of the humanities scholar in what can be called an elegy for Cassirer:  
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Ernst Cassirer and Giambattista Vico are separated by about one 
hundred and seventy-five years, but in the history of ideas, time 
spans never preclude intellectual affinities. This is especially true of 
Cassirer, who was particularly adept in the art of revitalizing the 
past. […] The clash of motifs never interested him per se. It is rather 
their complex intertwining, leading towards further tensions and 
resolutions which caught his eye, and these ramifications he 
masterfully traced in a dialectic as complicated as his subject-
matter, always focusing on the originating, on the creative currents 
of thought that opened up new directions as they revealed original 
turns of mind.81 
Yes, this elegy has diffractive qualities, as Cassirer and Vico are brought 
together cartographically in a shifting of calendar time. Polemics are 
exchanged for a more complex patterning of thoughts and arguments, and 
what we feel is admiration for a rhizomatic thought (Cassirer’s, Gadol’s). 
 
Traversing “Bergson’s Failing” 
Let me now finally move to Langer’s evaluation of Bergson’s intuition as a 
failure (it will become clear in due course that she does not so much evaluate 
Bergson’s intuition as a failure, but rather that her own initial reading of this 
methodological tool comes out as much more complex). The discussion 
takes place in the context of music as the art form expressing virtual time. 
The discussion appears to be Bergsonian right from the start: from the 
affirmation of the indivisibility of the artwork to the fact that music must 
neither be approached scientifically nor psychologically, and that musical 
elements are not there for analytic recognition but rather they are “virtual, 
created only for perception.”82 Langer then moves to her definition of music: 
“Musical motion, in short, is something entirely different from physical 
displacement. It is a semblance, and nothing more. […] The realm in which 
tonal entities move is a realm of pure duration. Like its elements, however, 
this duration is not an actual phenomenon. […] The semblance of this vital, 
experiential time is the primary illusion of music.”83 In light of all this, and 
in light of the motionless motion that Bergson-readers also find in the 
famous example of the melting sugar—“If I want to mix a glass of sugar and 
water, I must, willy nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little fact is big 
with meaning”84—how can it possibly be that Langer is dismissively critical 
of Bergson in the argumentative line that runs explicitly through the chapter 
on music? For her, at this point in her writing, Bergson is the philosopher of 
artists because despite his important insight in duration, and by way of his 
philosophical mirroring of the inner workings of musical art in particular, he 
has thrown out the baby with the bath water given that he proclaims, 
according to Langer, a non-discursivity that is detrimental to the 
philosophical profession. Hinting at Bergson’s claim to dispense with 
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symbols, Langer says that whereas Bergson’s philosophy of duration 
challenges the philosopher to “find us a symbolism whereby we can 
conceive and express our firsthand knowledge of time!” he “retires” 
prematurely and suggests that “[p]hilosophy must give up discursive 
thought, give up logical conception, and try to grasp intuitively the inward 
sense of duration. But it is not the intervention of symbolism as such that 
balks our understanding of ‘lived’ time; it is the unsuitable and consequently 
barren structure of the literal symbol.”85 Langer even states that Bergson 
falls into the trap of failing to notice that music is in fact organized and not a 
formless flow;86 the latter is a philosophical insight that is completely 
mistaken yet ascribed to Bergson and “which looks suspiciously like the 
abstract structure of Newton’s one-dimensional time-stream.”87 This 
evaluation makes Bergson’s philosophical work—in spite of its usefulness 
for musicians’ discussion about music—stand in unreal opposition to 
authoritative Science and to psychology in its common-sensical format. Both 
of which are, as we know, Bergson’s own main enemies.  
Langer wants to be able to think music’s necessary structure, and she 
asserts that virtual space is music’s secondary illusion88 which “simply arises 
from the way virtual time unfolds in this or that individual work—arises, 
and is eclipsed again.”89 So spatiality is the actualization of the virtual and the 
movement in which what is actualized feeds back into the virtual is the structure 
that makes music so suitable for philosophizing about art. After all, 
Philosophy in a New Key was the first Langer-book to zoom in on music as an 
exemplary art form and this book explained how music is neither right or 
wrong, nor completely tied up with “Affektenlehre” (doctrine of affects)90 The 
former take on music is evoked by a scientistic inclination and the latter 
comes from scholars who have fallen into the trap of the non-discursive, a 
trap that Langer also ascribes to Bergson as we saw above. Both positions do 
not allow for reaching music’s necessary structure and thus for constructing 
a philosophy of (musical) art. The relation between music and meaning is so 
complex because both sides of the coin of this relation (when seen along the 
lines of linear causality) have it wrong: “[Music’]s ‘meaning’ is evidently not 
that of a stimulus to evoke emotions, nor that of a signal to announce them; 
[…] it is not usually derived from affects nor intended for them; but we may 
say, with certain reservations, that it is about them.”91 This impersonal take 
on affect wishes to undo every possibility of reverting to an epistemological 
individualism—in terms of either the disembodied Subject or the embodied 
subject or the musical unit of information—and has far-reaching 
consequences for how we understand the one who listens to music (and 
below it will become clear that this listener is also the composer and the 
performer, not only the one in the audience or engaging with LP records or 
[nowadays] iPods and ending up attempting to write a philosophy of music 
or not). 
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Let us unpack in more detail what this “impersonal” entails, because 
even Langer herself re-introduces a personal dimension in her writing about 
music. Just like the reader of narrative poetry or prose is confronted with 
impersonal life (the interlocking of past-present-future, the ability to 
experience the whole story), the one engaging with music experiences time 
(and space) impersonally: 
The real power of music lies in the fact that it can be “true” to the 
life of feeling in a way that language cannot; for its significant 
forms have that ambivalence of content which words cannot have. 
[…] Music is revealing, where words are obscuring, because it can 
have not only a content, but a transient play of contents. It can 
articulate feelings without becoming wedded to them. […] The 
assignment of meanings is a shifting, kaleidoscopic play, probably 
below the threshold of consciousness, certainly outside the pale of 
discursive thinking. The imagination that responds to music is 
personal and associative and logical, tinged with affect, tinged with 
bodily rhythm, tinged with dream, but concerned with a wealth of 
formulations for its wealth of wordless knowledge, its whole 
knowledge of emotional and organic experience, of vital impulse, 
balance, conflict, the ways of living and dying and feeling. Because 
no assignment of meaning is conventional, none is permanent 
beyond the sound that passes; yet the brief association was a flash 
of understanding. The lasting effect is, like the first effect of speech 
on the development of the mind, to make things conceivable rather 
than to store up propositions.92 
Here it is useful to turn to Keith Ansell-Pearson’s introduction to Bergson’s 
1919 Mind-Energy in which he states: “The body is a centre of action and not 
a house of representation.”93 Pearson continues by attending to Bergson’s 
notion of “impersonal perception” as developed in the opening chapter of 
Matter and Memory (I alluded to this “impersonal interlocking of past-
present-future” in an earlier section of this essay with reference to 
Whitehead). The argument in Matter and Memory is an attempt to do away 
with the “brain in a vat,” so to speak, which is an assumption giving rise to 
the (false) idea of an ideal (i.e., undisturbed) perception and at the same 
time, of course, it wants to avoid the idea (equally false, because predicated 
on the same assumption) of a full subjectivism.94 Here is what Bergson 
argues: 
There is no perception which is not full of memories. With the 
immediate and present data of our senses we mingle a thousand 
details out of our past experience. In most cases these memories 
supplant our actual perceptions, of which we then retain only a few 
hints, thus using them merely as “signs” that recall to us former 
images. […] The individual accidents are merely grafted on to this 
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impersonal perception, which is at the very root of our knowledge 
of things.95 
The material universe, for Bergson, is the totality of images. This totality of 
images is a so-called archive from which the subject emerges. Claire 
Colebrook writes, “There are not subjects who then perceive; there is an 
impersonal plane of perceptions from which subjects are folded.”96 Music, in 
Langer’s definition, gives us the semblance of how time and space perception 
oscillates between the personal (i.e., the accidental) and the impersonal, just 
like there is the intersecting pendular movement between the virtual and the 
actual, which allows us to understand how the individual accidents feed 
back into the impersonal archive. This is a situation of immanence, because 
signs, and therefore signification per se, occur from within the totality of 
images and add to this totality at the same time. Bergson’s impersonal 
perception properly places the elements of Langer’s previously quoted 
“personal and associative and logical imagination in response to music, 
concerned with a wealth of formulations for its wealth of wordless 
knowledge.” Thus, in conclusion, Bergson does not work with a formless 
flow; his “perception, enlarged by memory,”97 is precisely how Langer fills 
musical volume or, simply, time (and secondarily space, which occurs from 
temporality): “The phenomena that fill time are tensions—physical, 
emotional, or intellectual. […] Some tensions […] always sink into the 
background; some drive and some drag, but for perception they give quality 
rather than form to the passage of time, which unfolds in the pattern of the 
dominant and distinct strains whereby we are measuring it.”98 Giving her 
requirement of form (Langer requires discursivity) its proper place by 
focusing on the qualification of time’s passing, I want to read the former 
quotation as a confirmation of the work of Bergson, from whose Matter and 
Memory Langer quotes in a footnote on exactly those pages discussing the 
filling of musical volume. It is indeed in this book (Matter and Memory) that 
Bergson comes up with the famous circles of memory and the equally well 
known inverted memory cone which are the quintessentially Bergsonian 
ways of saying that past, present, and future; and action, perception, and 
memory are in a constant process of intermingling. Is this not precisely 
affirming that art is indeed “an epistemological datum about which we can 
philosophize”?99 The Bergsonian “non-discursive” complies with Langer’s 
definition of art. That is to say, “Bergson’s failing” is too polemical, indeed. 
 
Conclusion: Meeting the Artist Halfway 
Feeling and Form is the book in which Langer, who considers “aesthetics” an 
unfortunate word,100 develops a philosophy of art true to art’s nature and 
import. She wants to do justice to the differing art forms—most of which I 
have mentioned in this essay either exhaustively or in passing—while at the 
same time coming up with an ontology of art per se. Interestingly and as 
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announced above, this ontology is in fact an onto-epistemology given the 
prominence Langer gives to how to reach this layer of theorizing about artistic 
creation. I have only been able to familiarize myself with Langer’s answer to 
the question “what does art create?” by bringing in Bergson and relying on 
the new materialist impetus in gender research, part and parcel of which is 
the Harawayian-Baradian diffractive wave I mentioned earlier.  
Langer suggests that what we do as art lovers or art theorists is “trying 
to meet the artist halfway.”101 It is not a philosophical Problem that we are 
after in order to solve it once and for all. We are not after the artists’ 
biographies either.102 Art lovers or art theorists enter “into a direct relation 
not with the artist, but with the work,” and the artist “is showing. He is 
showing us the appearance of feeling, in a perceptible symbolic projection; 
but he does not refer to a public object, such as a generally known ‘sort’ of 
feeling, outside his work.”103 This meeting of the artist “halfway” is 
structurally related to Bergson’s “leaving matter halfway.”104 I want to bring 
this essay to a close by meditating on this position. This meditation brings 
Bergson’s philosophical appeal (for Langer) a step further. 
Just like philosophy as a “living venture” creates its past in one stroke 
with its future, the moment an artwork “detaches itself from its actual 
setting” it “acquires a different context,” and this context includes past, 
present, and future.105 In other words, “when the first semblance of organic 
form is achieved” by the artist, “a work of art exhibits its general symbolic 
possibilities, like a statement imperfectly made or even merely indicated, but 
understandable in its general intent.”106 This “first semblance” contains 
everything; it is “the expression of an impersonal Idea,” “not essentially 
restrictive, but fecund.”107 It clicks into place, says Langer echoing Étienne 
Souriau108 and Gilbert Simondon,109 and she calls this phase of the original 
conception of the work that is not a point of origin somewhere in the past 
“the commanding form of the work,” or the “matrix idea,” or “the recognition 
of the matrix.”110 Importantly, this somewhere is where the artist dwells. 
Langer’s science and technology studies of the studio (not of the laboratory, 
although her book must also be seen as a study of the somewhere of the 
philosopher of art) has led to the following insight: “Most composers [and 
these artists are taken to be exemplary here] carry the act of creative 
imagination from its inception as a “commanding form,” or matrix idea […], 
to a point somewhere before the full realization of the musical work, which is 
the performed piece.”111 Earlier I alluded to the fact that the maker (both 
composer and performer) is in its own audience, but here I wish to highlight 
something less empirical and more speculative.112 Every artwork is 
motivated or excited by a commanding form or matrix idea that is virtual 
and demanding, which the artist carries or pushes to a place before full 
realization. This place is where philosophical research on art should 
commence. Philosophers of art are not to start their work from the fully 
realized piece or performance. In the Bergsonian terms I referenced in the 
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opening section of this essay: there is “a sounding of which one feels that it 
has more or less reached the bottom of a same ocean, even though it brings 
each time to the surface very different materials,” and this sounding is the 
commanding form or matrix, whereby the driving up of materials to the 
surface is what happens in this time slot before full realization.113 Intuition is 
the faculty that one employs in this time slot, which is a present slot that 
spills over into past and future. Analysis works “on these materials,” and by 
way of a “retrograde movement,”114 analysts can only capture what is no 
longer spilling, what has come to a practical and/or theoretical standstill.115  
The artist “does not refer to a public object, such as a generally known 
‘sort’ of feeling, outside his work,” Langer said. We may add to this and say 
that the material artwork itself, just like its representation, is not a public 
object either. Contradictory as it may seem given the importance given to art 
in the public sphere in most countries and by most institutions (including 
political parties and advocacy groups) and given the objects of research in 
Art History programs world-wide, Langer is indifferent to this material 
aspect of the work of art (which includes the representational). She is 
interested in “its form no matter what materials it uses”116 and says that 
“materials from any source whatever must be put to completely artistic use, 
entirely transformed, so that they do not lead away from the work, but give 
it, instead, the air of being ‘reality.’”117 These materials are words and clay 
and paint and bodies and sounds and morals.118 The artist works on what he 
“cannot know before he expresses it.”119 His (or her) practice is material-
semiotic, and technical-conceptual, and all of these envelopments lead to 
artworks that express an otherness without an Other.120  
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